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ILLEGAL ABDUCTIONS BY STATE POLICE: SANCTIONS
FOR EVASION OF EXTRADITION STATUTES*
WHEN a person charged with crime is beyond the jurisdiction of the prose-
cuting state, its police lack power to bring him back for trial.' To fill this
law enforcement gap, e-x-tradition statutes set up procedures for delivery of
the accused by the state of refuge to the demanding state.2 But in practice
these procedures are not always observed.3 Police, either ignorant of the
statutes or impatient with technical delays, have sometimes crossed state lines
*Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1951), ccrt. grantcd, 20 U.S.L V=a
3113 (1951).
1. SPEAus, THE LAw OF ExraTrromN 346-7 (1879).
2. "'A person charged in any state withr treason, felony, or other crime, who shall
flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority
of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having
jurisdiction of the crime." U.S. CoNsT. ART. IV, § 2(2).
Pursuant to this article, federal statutes have been enacted. 1S U.S.C. §§318., 3194,
3195 (Supp. 1946). These statutes prescribe the procedure for returning a fugitive to
a state where a crime is charged against him. The federal statutory requirements must
be met before a person can be extradited. Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 401 (1903);
In re Hubbard, 201 N.C. 472, 160 S.E. 569 (1931).
Although the federal law is supreme, states may provide machinery for applying the
law of extradition in respect to matters not covered by the acts of Congress. See, c.g.,
Moore v. Illinois, 14 Howard 12 (U.S. 1852) ; Ex parte Morgan, 78 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.
Cal. 1948), aff'd, 175 F2d 404 (9th Cir. 1949). States have legislated concerning the
method of applying for the writ of habeas corpus, the method of arrest and detention of
the fugitive before extradition is demanded, the mode of preliminary trial, the means
of applying for the requisition, the extent of asylum allowed, and the e.\traditees'
exemption from civil process. The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 9 Urns'. LAws
ANN. 169 (1951) (cited hereafter as Uniform Act), which codifies procedure among
the states, has been enacted by 34 states and Hawaii See, e.g., CT.- PiNAL Co o §§ 1548-
1556.2 (Deering 1949); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.1285(1)-28.1285(31) (Supp. 1949). See
also the extradition statutes of the states which have not adopted the Uniform Act. E.g.,
VAsH. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 2241-2246 (Remington 1932).
For general discussion of extradition, see 1 MooRE, ExMArTIoN MaD INTrlnSTATE
RENDITION (1891); HunD, HABEAs Coapus (2d ed. 1876).
3. For cases in which courts found that extradition procedure was ignored, see
Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888) (accused under indictment in Kentucky abducted
from West Virginia by a mob led by a state agent); Leahy v. Kunkel, 4 F. Supp. 849
(N.D. Ind. 1933) (Indiana officers seized accused in Chicago after hearing he was there,
and forcefully brought him back to the state. The warrant was read to the defendant
only after his return); Kingen v. Keeley, 3 Wyo. 566, 28 Pac. 36 (1891) (accused
hunted down in Nebraska by Wyoming authorities and forcibly returned). Additional
cases in which irregular return was alleged are: Hatfield v. Wardea of State Prison,
88 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Mich. 1948) (prisoner alleged he was kidnaped from Texas to
Michigan by Michigan officials) ; Jackson v. Olson, 146 Neb. 885, 22 N.W. 2d 124 (1946)
(prisoner alleged he was forcibly brought in chains from California to Nebraska).
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and forcibly removed accused persons.4 Occasionally officers of the asylum
state cooperate in such evasion of the extradition law.5
Abductions by police have generally been carried out with impunity. Courts
hold that the manner in which a defendant's presence was secured does not
impair their jurisdiction to try him.6 If a defendant was properly indicted
and his rights were observed during the trial, he cannot successfully claim a
denial of due process on the ground that he was illegally returned from an-
other state. 7
Departing from prevailing judicial attitudes, the recent case of Collins v.
Frisbie 8 threatens stern consequences if police fail to extradite suspects pro-
perly. Collins, indicted for murder in Michigan, was apprehended in Illinois.
Ignoring the extradition statutes, Illinois officers allegedly placed him in the
custody of police who had come from Michigan. According to Collins, the
Michigan officers beat him with blackjacks, threw him in the trunk of an
automobile, and thus forcibly returned him to Michigan for trial. Eight years
after his conviction, Collins asked a federal court to release him by habeas
corpus on the ground that the abduction invalidated his trial. The trial court
4. See Kingen v. Keeley, 3 Wyo. 566, 575, 28 Pac. 36, 39 (1891) (state officers
ignored extradition act because of its technical requirements which would delay more
prompt return of the fugitives). Note also the actions of the officers in Leahy v. Kunkel,
4 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Ind. 1933) cited in note 3 supra. Their action can only be attri-
buted to ignorance of the law or impatience with technical delay.
For discussion of causes for police violation of criminal procedure see HoPKINS, Oul
LAwLESS POLICE 314-47 (1931).
5. See Ex parte Glenn, 103 Fed. 947 (C.C.D. W.Va. 1900) (prison jailer of asylum
state illegally aided in turning defendant over to West Virginia authorities) ; Leahy v.
Kunkel, 4 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Ind. 1933) (Illinois officers cooperated with Indiana
officials in removing the defendant from Illinois); see also allegations in Collins v.
Frisbie, 189 F. 2d 464 (6th Cir. 1951) (cooperation by officials of asylum state to secure
abduction of extraditee). See Uniform Act § 11, which prescribes penalties for officers
of the asylum state who violate the act.
6. E.g., People v. Klinger, 319 Ill. 275, 149 N.E. 799 (1925); State v. Owen, 119
Ore. 15, 244 Pac. 516 (1926). In state habeas corpus proceedings the trial courts' juris-
diction has been upheld even though violence was allegedly committed on the person to
secure return. E.g., Jackson v. Olson, 146 Neb. 885, 22 N.W. 2d 124 (1946). Nor can
the person claim as a trial defense the forceful methods utilized to return him. E.g.,
Wilson v. State, 145 So. 591 (Ala. App. 1933); State v. Day, 58 Iowa 678, 12 N.W.
733 (1882). Only Kansas recognizes illegal seizure and abduction as a valid defense.
State v. Simmons, 39 Kan. 262, 18 Pac. 177 (1888). The rationale of the decision was
that a state could not tolerate breaches of the peace in sister states by their own police
officials.
The federal courts have also followed the general rule that a trial court's jurisdiction
is not impaired by the manner in which the defendant was brought into the state. E.g.,
Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537 (1893); Sheehan v. Huff, 142 F. 2d 81 (D.C. Cir.
1944). But cf. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
7. Kerr v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) ; Hatfield v. Warden, 88 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.
Mich. 1950). Contra: Brown v. Frisbie, 178 F. 2d 271 (6th Cir. 1949).
8. 189 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. grantcd, 20 U.S.L. WEsiK 3113 (1951).
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denied the writ.9 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. It
held that Collins' allegations, if proved, showed that police who brought him
from Illinois were guilty of kidnaping under the federal Anti-kidnaping (Lind-
bergh) Act.10 Violation of a federal criminal statute, the court declared,
could not be the instrument for asserting jurisdiction over criminal defend-
ants.11
The Collins decision rests on shaky ground. The Lindbergh Act is limited
to cases where the kidnaper seeks some benefit, usually pecuniary.- To hold
that police officers' interest in apprehending a fugitive satisfies the statutory
requirements seems unduly loose construction, especially when violators of
the Act may be punished by death. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the stat-
ute, aimed at organized crime, was ever intended to apply to state officials
acting under color of law.13 A further weakness of the Collins holding is that
9. In re Collins, No. 90S6 (FD. Mich. 1950).
10. "Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce any person
who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped, abducted, or
carried away and held for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in case of a minor,
by a parent thereof, shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnaped person has not been
liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by im-
prisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed." 18
U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. 1946) (popularly known as the Lindbergh Act).
11. Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F. 2d 464, 463 (6th Cir. 1951).
Contrast however the attitude of the Supreme Court toward violation by the state
officers of the prohibition against illegal searches and seizures. Though conceding that
such searches and seizures violate the 14th Amendment and perhaps the Civil Rights
Act, Rzv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1946), the court refuses to apply federal
sanctions against such conduct. Stefanelli et al. v. Minard et aL, 72 Sup. Ct. 118 (1951);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
12. The kidnaping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. 1946), expressly states the person
abducted must be held for ransom or reward or otherwise. However the courts have held
that 'otherwise! may include any benefits which may accrue to the violator of the act,
and does not restrict kidnaping to cases involving pecuniary benefit to the abductors.
Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936) (state officers abducted by fugitives to
avoid arrest); Poindexter v. United States, 139 F. 2d 158 (Sth Cir. 1943) (rape was
purpose of abduction) ; United States v. Parker, 103 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1939) (private
person abducted another to elicit a confession of crime); United States v. Cleveland,
146 F. 2d 730 (10th Cir. 1945) (girl transported across state line for immoral purposes).
This interpretation brings the federal statute close to the common law crime of kidnap-
ing under which no benefit is required. See 4 BL CoMM. *219.
13. The Colli,. case marks the first time that the Lindbergh Act has been applied to
police officials acting under the color of law. In Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455
(1946), the court refused to recognize transportation for celestial marriage purposes to
be a violation of the act. The ostensible basis for the decision was the absence of the
necessary physical restraint. However the court stated that the kidnaping law was de-
signed to assist the states in stamping out the sinister and growing menace of kidnaping.
Chatwin v. United States, supra at 463. And it has been argued that the Teal basis of
the decision was the Court's refusal to extend the Lindbergh Act beyond the menace of
organized crime. 30 MINN. L REv. 206 (1946). See Finley, The Lindbcrgh Lin,, 23
Gmo. L J. 903 (1940).
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petitioner did not first seek relief in state courts. Exhaustion of state remedies
isan essential preliminary to obtaining habeas corpus in federal courts. 14
However dubious the court's legal conclusions, its desire to lend federal
encouragement to the enforcement of established extradition procedure is
praiseworthy. While the main purpose of extradition statutes is to aid law
enforcement officials,' 5 these laws also provide basic safeguards for accused
persons. An individual cannot be removed until his identity is established
and it is shown that he is validly charged with crime, that he fled from justice,
and that a proper demand has been made for his return.10 He can test the
proposed extradition by habeas corpus proceedingsY Moreover, extradition
14. 62 STAT. 967 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. 1946); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S.
200 (1949). See Miller, J., dissenting in Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F. 2d 464, 468 (6th Cir.
1951). Federal courts have disclaimed jurisdiction in extradition cases where the petitioner
has not exhausted his asylum state remedies. Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
15. See Biddinger v. Commissioner, 245 U.S. 128 (1917); Appleyard v. Massachu.
setts, 203 U.S. 222, 227 (1906) ; Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537, 542 (1893).
16. 18 U.S.C. §3182 (Supp. 1946). The Uniform Extradition Act also contains these
requirements.
In addition, the demanding state must submit a copy of an indictment or affidavit made
before a magistrate charging the person with treason, felony or other crime. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3182 (Supp. 1946). This is also required under the Uniform Act. For the technical
content requirements of the papers, see Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387 (1908) ; Hyatt v.
Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903) ; United States v. O'Brien, 138 F. 2d 217 (7th Cir. 1943).
Any method prescribed by the demanding state for institution of a criminal proceeding
satisfies the quantum of proof required by the federal statute. Biddinger v. Commissioner,
245 U.S. 128 (1917) ; Ex parte Morgan, 78 F. Supp. 756, 761 (S.D. Cal. 1948), af/'d,
175 F. 2d 404 (9th Cir. 1949).
The governor of the asylum state can issue a warrant for arrest only after consider-
ing the authenticity of the criminal charge. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (Supp. 1946), Uniform
Act §§ 2, 7. For explicit statement of governors' duties see Graffenreid, The Law of v-
tradition, 2 ALA. L. Rsv. 207 (1950). However under Uniform Act § 13, a person charged
with a crime in another state can be arrested in the asylum state before the extradition
requests are made. And § 14 allows arrest without a warrant upon reasonable information
that the accused stands charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable by death
or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.
17. Although the constitutional extradition clause and its enabling statutes do not
provide for habeas corpus proceedings, this ancient common law right was early applied
to rendition procedures. See Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885). See also Uniform
Act § 10 which provides for habeas corpus in the state courts. In habeas corpus pro-
ceedings .the question is whether the legal extradition requirements have been met and
not whether the accused is guilty or innocent. E.g., Whitaker v. Hitt, 285 Fed. 797 (D.C.
Cir. 1922) ; Kingsbury's Case, 106 Mass. 223 (1870) ; Uniform Act § 20. The court may
consider whether the accused is charged with a crime against the laws of the demanding
state. E.g., Commonwealth v. Hare, 36 Pa. Super. 125, 130 (1908). And it may also
determine if the accused is actually the individual wanted. Uniform Act § 20 (allows
guilt or innocence to be looked into to determine the identity of the person) ; see Letwick
v. State, 211 Ark. 1, 4, 198 S.W. 2d 830, 831 (1947).
Several recent decisions have granted substantive safeguards. Upon proof of certain
kinds of deprivation of constitutional rights by the demanding state, the defendant must
be freed by the courts in the asylum state upon habeas corpus. Commonwealth ex rel.
Mattox v. Superintendent, 152 Pa. Super. 167, 31 A. 2d 576 (1943) (lynching); Joln-
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requires action by the refuge state's governor.18 If he believes that the extra-
diting state may deprive the accused of constitutional rights, the governor
has an opportunity to grant asylum by refusing to act.' 0 Requiring observance
of statutory procedure should also tend to minimize possible police brutality
incident to returning a fugitive. Unlawful seizure and abduction by officials
acting beyond their jurisdiction, if condoned by courts, is likely to result in
violence as it did in Collins' case.
Since the Sixth Circuit's attempt to enforce compliance with the extradition
statute is unlikely to be upheld, a legislative solution is necessary. Congress
should amend the e-x-tradition statute to provide that violation of its provisions
deprives the extraditing state's courts of jurisdiction to try the accused.*20
Defendants could invoke this statute at trial, or in habeas proceedings.2
Congress should also enact suitable penalities for officers who disregard the
law.2
2
son v. Dye, 175 F. 2d 250 (3rd Cir. 1949) (cruel and unusual punishment--chain gang;
reversed by United States Supreme Court, 338 U.S. 864 (1949) on non-e.'haustion of
state remedy theory). But cf. Johnson v. Mathews, 182 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950).
For general historical background of individual rights in interstate rendition see
Hoague, Extradition Betueen States, 13 Am. L. Rzv. 181 (1879).
18. See Graffenreid, supra note 16.
19. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (U.S. 1861) held that the federal extradition
statutes do not provide any means to compel a governor of an asylum state to extradite.
And in dicta the Court also stated the constitutional clause itself did not permit such
compulsion. Federal courts have followed this decision and ruled that no power of the
federal government presently exists to compel extradition by a state. See e.g., Applica-
tion of Mliddlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943, 952 (S.D. Cal. 1950). Since the federal extradition
statute has not been changed since the Dennison decision, the issue of whether the Con-
stitution gives the government power to compel extradition has never actually been be-
fore the courts. And where the extradition requirements have been violated, the prisoner,
once in the demanding state, can claim no federal right. E.g., Mslahon v. Justice, 127 U.S.
700 (1888) (since federal law makes no provision for the return of an illegally seized
person, he cannot claim release; nor does he have any right of asylum in the state to
which he has fled).
20. This action might be taken under the commerce clause.. It has been held that
transportation of people across state lines is commerce. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160, 172 (1941). And Congress has already enacted legislation under the commerce clause
making it a federal offense to move in interstate commerce for the purpose of avoiding
prosecution or confinement after conviction for certain enumerated crimes under the laws
of the place from which one has fled. Fugitive Felon Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (Supp. 1946) ;
Simmons v. Zerbst, 18 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Ga. 1937); United States v. filler, 17 F.
Supp. 65 (W.D. Ky. 1936).
21. Lack of jurisdiction has traditionally been a basis for release at any time.
McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (1902); In re Shull, 221 Ito. 623, 121 S.AV. 10
(1909).
22. Cf. Uniform Act § 11 declaring that an officer of the asylum state who wilfully
deprives an accused of the rights enunciated in § 10 is guilty of a misdemeanor and is
subject to penal fine or sentence. The fine cannot exceed $1000.00 nor the sentence 6
months. Curiously enough, no penalty provision is made for officers of the trial state who
deprive the accused of his rights in another state.
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Freeing accused persons who were illegally extradited need not defeat the
state's legitimate interest in prosecuting and convicting the guilty. The in-
dividual released on habeas corpus could be retried and reconvicted, after
being properly extradited.2 However, existing extradition procedures fail to
provide machinery to return an accused to an asylum state so that he can be
lawfully extradited. 24 Since the illegality of the original removal persists
until the defendant is properly extradited, he might at present secure per-
manent immunity from trial simply by refusing to leave the trying state.
Such permanent immunity for defendants would be a high price to pay for
encouraging compliance with extradition requirements. But legislation could
prevent this possibility. If the accused remains in the state for an unreason-
able period of time, he should be deemed to have waived the abduction de-
fense.25 State officers could then validly rearrest him. Such an amendment,
together with the other legislation proposed, would guarantee observance of
extradition procedures without hampering law enforcement.
23. Courts generally hold that a defendant released on his own motion cannot claim
that jeopardy attached to the first proceedings. Hence the person is deemed to have
waived the plea of double jeopardy in a second trial. E.g., Stroud v. United States, 251
U.S. 15 (1919) ; Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900); United States v. Low-
rey, 77 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
Some courts, however, hold that if a person is freed on habeas corpus double jeopardy
attaches to a new trial if the original trial court had jurisdiction when the trial started,
People ex rel. Meyer v. Warden, 269 N.Y. 426, 199 N.E. 647 (1936). But it is universally
held that where the trial court had absolutely no jurisdiction, double jeopardy cannot be
pleaded to a new indictment. Mitchell v. Youell, 130 F. 2d 880 (4th Cir. 1942) ; Ogle v.
State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 219, 63 S.W. 1009 (1901) ; State v. Odell, 4 Blackf. 156 (Ind.
1836).
24. Lack of statutory authority to return an illegally extradited defendant to the
asylum state has motivated courts in refusing to recognize illegal abduction as a barrier
to trial. See Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888). And this possibility is a genuine fear
of the states. See Brief and Argument for Writ of Certiorari, Frisbie v. Collins, U.S.
Supreme Court 12-3 (October 1951).
25. To achieve national uniformity, Congress could prescribe that an illegally ex-
tradited person should be given a reasonable time to return to the asylum state. Failure
to return within this period could be deemed a waiver of the defendants' federal right.
The state civil immunity statute prescribing reasonable time for return of a witness could
be a guide for federal action. Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses From
Without a State in CUiminal Proceedings, 9 UNIF. LAws ANx. 37 (1951).
There is a valid precedent for enacting legislation to permit the accused a reasonable
time to return to the asylum state. The Uniform Extradition Act stipulates that a person
brought into the state to face a criminal charge is immune from civil process until con-
victed or, if acquitted, until he has had a reasonable time to return to the asylum state
from which he was extradited. Uniform Act § 25.
Cf. the general common law rule that a non-resident entering a state to respond to a
criminal indictment is entitled to exemption from service of process in a civil case while
coming and going without unnecessary delay by the usual routes of travel. Church v.
Church, 270 Fed. 361 (D.C. Cir. 1921) ; See also Kaufman v. Garner, 173 Fed. 550, 554
(C.C. W.D. Ky. 1909); Murray v. Wilcox, 122 Iowa 188, 97 N.W. 1087 (1904).
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